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I. INTRODUCTION
This Essay describes how the United States Naval Station at
Guantánamo Bay, Cuba (“Guantánamo” or “GTMO”)1 developed
simultaneously outside and inside the scope of American law. While base
territory has been firmly under American control since troops landed on

∗

Associate Professor of Law, Chapman University School of Law, previous versions of
this Essay were presented on the panel “Movies and Multiracial Imaginaries: Identity
and Sovereignty Between Legal Borders” of the LatCrit XIV Annual Conference held
at the American University Washington College of Law, at University of Melbourne,
Valparaiso University Law School, and at Chapman University, and meetings of the
Law and Society Association, International Studies Association, and International Law
Association. The author thanks Eric Domínguez, Asal Nadjarzadehshiraz, and Sara
Naheedy for their helpful research assistance and Chapman University School of Law
for its support. The greater part of this Essay was written in the Spring of 2010; as
such, some developments may change how many detainees remain in Guantánamo.
1. This Essay refers to the U.S. Naval Station at Guantánamo Bay, Cuba as
“Guantánamo” or “GTMO.” The U.S. Navy uses the acronyms “GTMO” or “Gitmo.”
See
U.S.
Naval
Station
at
Guantanamo
Bay,
Cuba
Website,
http://www.cnic.navy.mil/Guantanamo/index.htm (last visited June 1, 2010).
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June 10, 1898,2 it has also been excluded from the rights and protections in
the Constitution and international law. GTMO is referred to as a “legal
black hole”3 or an “anomalous legal zone,” with “legal rules” fundamental
to larger policies “locally suspended” in a geographic area.4 Since 1903,
the United States has leased base territory from Cuba for an indefinite
period.5 It is surrounded by the sovereign territory of Cuba—originally an
American protectorate from 1898 to 1934 and presently a foreign policy
rival since 1961. This location illustrates the fragility of GTMO’s legal
jurisdiction, where rights are both protected and instead denied. Cubans,6
Haitians,7 and suspected terrorists have been detained at the base
undoubtedly inside American jurisdiction, yet outside the domestic legal
realm where their rights would be protected. Since 2002, nearly 800 men
have been detained on the base, far from their homes and sites of capture,
and without access to constitutional rights or international humanitarian
and human rights law.8
2. See U.S. LIBRARY OF CONG., Today in History: June 10,
http://lcweb2.loc.gov/ammem/today/jun10.html (examining the history of Guantánamo
with historical photography).
3. See Johan Steyn, Twenty-Seventh F.A. Mann Lecture, Guantánamo Bay: The
Legal Black Hole, in STATEWATCH (Nov. 25, 2003) http://www.statewatch.org/news
/2003/nov/guantanamo.pdf; Clive Stafford Smith, America’s Black Hole, L.A. TIMES,
Oct. 5, 2007, at A27.
4. Gerald L. Neuman, Anomalous Zones, 48 STAN. L. REV. 1197, 1201 (1996)
[hereinafter Neuman, Anomalous Zones].
5. See Agreement Between the United States and Cuba for the Lease of Lands for
Coaling for Naval Stations, U.S.-Cuba, Feb. 16–23, 1903, T.S. No. 418, art. III
[hereinafter U.S.-Cuba Feb. 1903 Lease]. A 1934 treaty between the United States and
Cuba makes U.S. base occupation in effect indefinite. It states that for the lease period
to end, one of two things must occur: (1) the United States stops occupying the base; or
(2) Cuba and the United States mutually agree to stop the occupation. Accordingly,
base occupation only stops when the United States chooses so. See Treaty Between the
United States of America and Cuba Defining Their Relations, U.S.-Cuba, May 29,
1934, 48 Stat. 1682 [hereinafter U.S.-Cuba 1934 Treaty].
6. See JANA K. LIPMAN, GUANTÁNAMO: A WORKING-CLASS HISTORY BETWEEN
EMPIRE AND REVOLUTION 87-93 (2009) (describing events from the 1950s when
American military used base jurisdiction to detain Cubans).
7. From 1991 to 1993, the United States detained various Haitian and Cuban
asylum seekers at the base. These experiences raised legal issues concerning whether
the Constitution and international law checked base authority. See also Cuban-Am.
Bar. Ass’n v. Christopher, 43 F.3d 1412, 1430 (11th Cir. 1995); Haitian Refugee Ctr.,
Inc. v. Baker, 953 F.2d 1498, 1506 (11th Cir. 1995) (finding constitutional rights do
not apply to asylum detainees); Haitian Ctrs. Council, Inc. v. McNary, 969 F.2d 1236,
1242 n.19 (2d Cir. 1992) (finding constitutional claims for asylum detainees probably
succeeding in court); Haitian Ctrs. Council, Inc. v. Sale, 823 F. Supp. 1028. 1042
(E.D.N.Y 1993) (holding that the due process clause of the Fifth Amendment applies to
the United States Naval Base at Guantánamo, later vacated); Gerald L. Neuman,
Closing the Guantánamo Loophole, 50 LOY. L. REV. 1, 3-5, 42-44 (2004) [hereinafter
Neuman, Closing the Guantánamo Loophole]; Neuman, Anomalous Zones, supra note
4, at 1197–1201, 1228-30. See generally Sale v. Haitian Ctrs. Council, Inc., 509 U.S.
155, 158-59 (1993) (rejecting challenges to detention authority).
8. It is estimated that 779 persons have been detained at the base since January
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GTMO exemplifies “outsiders inside,” referring to detainees who are
simultaneously outside the protection of American law yet inside American
jurisdiction. Most dramatic of these prisoners are Uighur Turkic Muslims
from China, detainees whom the United States no longer classifies as
enemy combatants and yet remain on the base for years.9 Kept at a
different site from other detainees, they are not free to leave the base. They
are not returned to China for fear that they would be subjected to torture or
human rights abuse. For years now, five Uighur detainees remain as
literally outsiders inside.10 After years of diplomatic efforts, some were
transferred to Albania, Bermuda, and others states; more recently, others
were transferred to Palau and Switzerland.11 On October 8, 2008, District
Court Judge Ricardo M. Urbina ordered the then remaining seventeen
Uighur detainees released into the United States.12 However, following
that decision two circuit courts of appeals decisions barred that release.13
The Supreme Court granted certiorari in October 2009, and in March 2010

2002; the majority of these have been released or transferred. As of June 29, 2010, 181
detainees remain at GTMO. See The Guantanamo Docket: Detainees Held, N.Y. TIMES
(2010), http://projects.nytimes.com/guantanamo/detainees/held; see also Names of the
WASH.
POST
(2010),
Detained
in
Guantanamo
Bay,
Cuba,
http://projects.washingtonpost.com/guantanamo; BROOKINGS INST., THE CURRENT
DETAINEE POPULATION OF GUANTÁNAMO: AN EMPIRICAL STUDY (Dec. 16, 2008 & Oct.
21, 2009) available at http://www.brookings.edu/reports/2008/1216_detainees_
wittes.aspx.
9. See Parhat v. Gates, 532 F.3d 834, 837 (D.C. Cir. 2008). See generally Caprice
L. Roberts, Rights, Remedies, & Habeas Corpus – The Uighurs, Legally Free While
Actually Imprisoned, 24 GEO. IMMIGR. L.J. 1 (2009).
10. The New York Times reports that as of September 1, 2010, these five detainees
have been held at Guantánamo for at least eight years. They include: Yusef Abbas,
Hajiakbar Abdulghupur, Saidullah Khalik, Ahmed Mohamed, and Abdul Razak. For
specific information and documents concerning their detention, see, e.g., The
Sept.
1,
2010,
Guantánamo
Docket:
Yusef
Abbas,
N.Y. TIMES,
http://projects.nytimes.com/guantanamo/detainees/275-yusef-abbas.
11. Twenty-two Uighurs were brought to the base. Five were resettled in Albania,
four in Bermuda, two in Switzerland, and six in Palau. See Tony Mauro, Supreme
Court Orders New Briefing in Uighur Case, NAT’L LAW J., Feb. 16, 2010
http://www.law.com/jsp/article.jsp?id=1202443274487; see also Amanda Dale, US
judge ‘Scoffs’ as he suggests Bermuda as possible destination for more Uighurs, THE
ROYAL
GAZETTE
(Bermuda),
Ap.
26,
2010,
available
at
http://www.royalgazette.com/rg/Article/article.jsp?articleId=7da4d273003000a&sectio
nId=60. Uighurs relocated to Palau and Bermuda argue their status there remain an
anomaly without the right to travel or without citizenship. See Bernadette Carreon,
Uighur refugees plead to leave Pacific Island, AM. FREE PRESS, Jan. 14, 2010, available
at http://www.google.com/hostednews/afp/article/
ALeqM5iz5PF3FdBzhDua1GoRn6lYV5haFQ; Sam Strangeways, UK will not issue
passports to the Uighur Four – Gozney, ROYAL GAZETTE (Bermuda), Jan. 11, 2010,
available
at
http://www.royalgazette.com/rg/Article/article.jsp?articleId
=7da65ab30030005&sectionId=60.
12. See In re Guantanamo Bay Detainee Litig., 581 F. Supp. 2d 33, 37 (D.D.C.
2008).
13. See Kiyemba v. Obama, 561 F.3d 509, 516 (D.C. Cir. 2009).
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the Court vacated the appellate judgment and remanded the case.14 On
May 28th, 2010, the circuit court reinstated its initial 2009 decision with
additional facts concerning resettlement offers. This leaves the detainees,
who do not accept their re-settlement offers, on the base, unable to leave
and waiting for the Supreme Court to grant certiorari again or for the
Administration to negotiate another re-settlement offer. As of September
1, 2010, their fate remains sealed inside base jurisdiction but outside rights
protection, with five of them contesting their relocation to Palau.15 Judge
Urbina was a keynote speaker at the LatCrit XIV Conference, for which
this Essay is written.
This Essay comments on the conference’s theme of “Outsiders Inside:
Critical Outsider Theory and Praxis in the Policymaking of the New
American Regime.”16 This theme asks how the Obama Administration, led
by the first American president of color, may bring change that reflects
critical legal values.17 Legal debates about the base ask: “is detention
(il)legal,” “do detainees have rights,” and “does the Constitution reach the
detainees?” From a more historical and contextual light, Guantánamo
presents myriad critical race themes, including issues such as: racial
subjugation (Cuba’s population is primarily non-Anglo―Latino, Black,
and mixed-race); the resulting infractions of Cuban sovereignty (including
the Platt Amendment of 1902, military interventions such as the Bay of
Pigs, and the indefinite base occupation); and the denial of human rights to
detained non-Anglos (first with past detentions of Haitians and Cubans, and
now with War on Terror detainees). While President Obama plans to end
base detentions, this critical context is reified with continued base
14. See Kiyemba v. Obama, 130 S. Ct. 1235 (Mar. 1, 2010) (remanding to
determine if further proceedings are needed, for five Uighur detainees who have not
accepted resettlement offers); see also OFF. SOLICITOR GENERAL, U.S. DEPT. JUSTICE,
Re: Jamal Kiyemba v. Barack H. Obama, S.Ct. No. 08-1234, SCOTUSBLOG (Feb. 19,
2010), http://www.scotusblog.com/wp-content/uploads/2010/02/SG-Kiyemba-letter-219-10.pdf (reporting five Uighur detainees remain at the base out of an initial 22
detainees and 14 original petitioners and that the remaining Uighurs should receive
resettlement offers). But see Robert Barnes, Supreme Court dismisses case involving
resettlement of Guantanamo detainees, WASH. POST, Mar. 2, 2010, at A05; P. Sabin
Willet, Re: Kiyemba v. Obama, No. 08-1234, SCOTUSBLOG (Feb. 19, 2010),
http://www.scotusblog.com/wp-content/uploads/2010/02/Uighars-letter-brief-2-1910.pdf (arguing that resettlement offers represent government methods to avoid review
of detention cases and that separation of power problems persist since the judiciary
cannot provide a remedy); Lyle Denniston, Kiyemba back to lower court Circuit Court,
SCOTUSBLOG, Mar. 1, 2010, http://www.scotusblog.com/2010/03/kiyemba-back-tolower-court/.
15. See Dale, supra note 11; see also supra text accompanying note 14.
16. See LatCrit, LatCrit XIV Annual Conference Theme, Outsiders Inside: Critical
Outsider Theory and Praxis in the Policymaking of the New American Regime,
http://www.law.du.edu/latCrit/ACXIV.htm.
17. See id. (including critical values such as “internationalism and globalmindedness,” “human rights and multidimensional diversity,” antidiscrimination, and
interrogating assumptions in racial, gender, and sexual orientation terms).
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occupation despite decades of Cuban protests.
Building on these issues, this Essay offers a theoretical illumination on
why GTMO has anomalous jurisdictional borders. “Borders” are presented
as legal constructs demarcating who and what is inside state authority, but
potentially outside rights protections.18 They encapsulate the base as a
“legal black hole.” These outside and inside qualities are referred to as an
“anomaly.”19 GTMO’s anomaly stems from a 1903 agreement between the
United States and Cuba to lease the base. The agreement affirms that Cuba
has “ultimate sovereignty” over the base while the United States has
“complete jurisdiction and control.”20 In other words, the United States
lacks de jure sovereignty over base territory but has control and complete
jurisdiction, while Cuba is ultimately sovereign over base territory. For
American law, GTMO borders constructively demarcate what rights
protections exist (or not) inside the base. It has been argued that
constitutional rights require presence in United States sovereign territory―
in other words, not at an overseas base. 21 At times, American law clarifies
what rights protections exist within this anomaly, most recently regarding
habeas corpus and prisoner of war rights.22
This Essay asks: why was the base crafted as a legal anomaly? It offers
two preliminary suggestions: first, that American imperial sensibilities
since the creation of this base required anomaly and, second, that the
current anomaly is an extension of this history. Paraphrasing Alejandro
18. See Mary L. Dudziak & Leti Volpp, Introduction to LEGAL BORDERLANDS:
LAW AND THE CONSTRUCTION OF AMERICAN BORDERS 1, 1-17 (Mary L. Dudziak & Leti
Volpp eds., 2006) (describing borderlands as geographic spaces with “ideological
ambiguity” permitting “both repression and liberation” and borders as expressions of
power, territory, and identity).
19. Gerald Neuman describes GTMO as an anomalous legal zone, with “legal
rules” fundamental to larger policies “locally suspended” in a geographic area. See
Neuman, Anomalous Zones, supra note 4, at 1197, 1201; Neuman, Closing the
Guantánamo Loophole, supra note 7, at 3-5, 42-44.
20. U.S.-Cuba Feb. 1903 Lease, supra note 5, art. III.
21. E.g., MEMORANDUM FROM PATRICK F. PHILBIN AND JOHN C. YOO, DEPUTY
ASSISTANT ATTORNEYS GEN., OFFICE OF LEGAL COUNSEL, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, TO
WILLIAM J. HAYNES II, GEN. COUNSEL, U.S. DEP’T OF DEF., POSSIBLE HABEAS
JURISDICTION OVER ALIENS HELD IN GUANTANAMO BAY, CUBA, IN THE TORTURE
PAPERS: THE ROAD TO ABU GHRAIB 29-37 (Karen J. Greenberg & Joshua L. Dratel
eds., 2005) [hereinafter O.L.C. Memorandum]. See generally Brief for Respondent,
Boumediene v. Bush, 553 U.S. 723 (2008) (Nos. 06-1195 & 06-1196).
22. See Boumediene v. Bush, 553 U.S. 723, 723 (2008) (holding noncitizen
detainees on the base may invoke habeas corpus rights in the U.S. Constitution’s
Suspension Clause); Hamdan v. Rumsfield, 548 U.S. 557 (2006) (finding military
commissions applied by the George W. Bush administration to base detainees as
inconsistent with the Uniform Code of Military Justice and 1949 Geneva Conventions);
Rasul v. Bush, 542 U.S. 466 (2004) (holding noncitizen base detainees are protected by
statutory habeas corpus rights); Neuman, Closing the Guantánamo Loophole, supra
note 7 at 1, 38, 42-44 (describing how U.S. law has determined rights are protected on
the base regarding refugee, criminal law, and civil statutory rights)
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Colás’s works on empire’s material, cultural, and political attributes, this
Essay defines empire as metropolitan rule subordinating overseas
populations. This requires an expansion of territory under political rule
(lacking any identified limit), the protection of resource markets (to sustain
consumption and expansion), and an ideology of superiority (to legitimize
expansion).23 To support these objectives, the base had to be an anomaly
existing both “inside and outside” domestic and international jurisdictions.
The contrary would clearly delineate full U.S. or Cuban sovereignty over
base territory. Throughout history, base functions have capitalized on this
anomaly between sovereignties.24
Since 1898, the base has served imperial objectives of territorial and
economic expansion and cultural superiority. The law serves a vital
facilitating role by providing flexible determinations of jurisdiction,
deferring to political authority in foreign relations with the effect of
protecting overseas markets, and reinforcing assumptions of American
superiority.25 Examining this past illuminates the spatial, economic, and
cultural context of American extraterritoriality. Present engagement
overseas is not limited to GTMO. The situation in Iraq and Afghanistan,
along with overseas bases in over ninety countries,26 suggests American
extraterritoriality may only expand.
Three points summarize this Essay’s thesis.
First, spatially,
Guantánamo’s anomaly facilitates flexible control of base terrain by
limiting public obligations to protect individual rights. In order to execute
imperial authority over the base, Guantánamo had to be anomalous. With
this structure in place, the United States could extend its control of overseas
territory and Caribbean waterways without limits posed by sovereignty.
This flexibility was advantageous for American foreign relations.
Jurisprudence on extraterritorial authority, such as the Insular Cases (19011920), reflects these flexible borders, as well as the denial of full
23. ALEJANDRO COLÁS, EMPIRE 5 (2007). For a more elaborate description of
GTMO and empire, using Colás’ approach of empire as space, markets, and culture,
see Ernesto Hernández-López, Guantánamo as a “Legal Black Hole”: A Base for
Expanding Space, Markets, and Culture, 45 U.S.F. L REV. (forthcoming 2010)
(manuscript on file with author) [hereinafter Hernández-López, Legal Blackhole].
24. DAVID VINE, ISLAND OF SHAME: THE SECRET HISTORY OF THE U.S. MILITARY
BASE ON DIEGO GARCIA 190 (2009).
25. See infra III:A-C (describing GTMO’s history and empire as space, markets,
and culture), see also Hernández-López, Legal Black Hole, supra note 23. For
examples of deference to the political branches in foreign relations, see United States
v. Curtiss Wright Export Corp., 299 U.S. 304, 319-21 (1936); Walter LaFeber, The
“Lion in the Path”: The U.S. Emergence as a World Power, 101 POL. SCI. Q. 705, 714
(1986) [hereinafter LaFeber, Lion]; Walter Lafeber, The Constitution and United States
Foreign Policy: An Interpretation, 74 J. AM. HIST. 695 (1987) [LaFeber, Constitution];
Peter J. Spiro, Globalization and the (Foreign Affairs) Constitution, 63 OHIO ST. L.J.
649, 649-54 (2002).
26. See VINE, supra note 24, at 216 n. 8.
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constitutional rights of residents of these territories.27
Second, economically, the base supports the protection of resource
markets. It bolstered the U.S. “Sphere of Influence” (1898-1934)
objectives regarding Cuba, the Caribbean, and the Panama Canal. It
provided strategic support for military interventions in Cuba, the
Dominican Republic, Nicaragua, and Haiti.28 Interventions protected
American investments, deterring future non-payments or recuperating
funds owed to investors. As the first American overseas base, Guantánamo
was key to American security policies in the region and remains so today.
Third, culturally, the base promotes an ideology of American superiority
with manipulations of sovereignty and consequential race-based
exclusions. Base borders are set referring to sovereignty, with Cuba denied
full sovereignty.29 Determinations that populations are (or are not)
sovereign are embedded in cultural exclusions in international law.30
Cubans as a Hispanic, black, and mixed-race population could not be fully
sovereign or self-governing, as historically the “family of nations” rejected
the idea that non-Europeans could be fully sovereign. This happened with
the Treaty of Paris of 1898, which ceded Cuba to the United States from
Spain, the American occupation from 1898-1902, and the Platt Amendment
requiring a base in Cuba.31 The base is a product of the denial of
sovereignty to Cubans by U.S. policies and international law.
Part II of this Essay defines empire, combining critical theory’s material
and cultural interpretations. This contextualizes why Guantánamo was
created and how anomaly’s function adapts over time. Part III relates this
theory with GTMO’s legal history overseas in terms of space, economics,
and culture. Subsection III.A describes the base facilitating American
expansion without any defined limit, Subsection II.B presents how market

27. See, e.g., Downes v. Bidwell, 182 U.S. 244, 287 (1901).
28. See MARION E. MURPHY, THE HISTORY OF GUANTÁNAMO BAY 1494-1964,

(U.S. Navy 1964) (1953), available at https://www.cnic.navy.mil/Guantanamo
/AboutGTMO/gtmohistgeneral/gtmohistmurphy/gtmohistmurphyvol1/gtmohistmurphy
vol1index.
29. The Platt Amendment required Cuba to provide a base and GTMO became this
base. The lease agreements and treaty affirmed that this limit Cuba’s sovereignty while
avoiding American sovereignty. See U.S.-Cuba Feb. 1903 Lease, supra note 5; Ernesto
Hernández-López, Boumediene v. Bush and Guantánamo, Cuba: Does the “Empire
Strike Back?”, 61 SMU L. REV. 117, 153-167 (2009).
30. See generally ANTONY ANGHIE, IMPERIALISM, SOVEREIGNTY AND THE MAKING
OF INTERNATIONAL LAW (2004) (examining how post-colonial notions of sovereignty,
stemming from the cultural differences between European and non-European cultures,
have shaped modern day international law).
31. See LOUIS PEREZ, CUBA UNDER THE PLATT AMENDMENT 29-31 (1991)
(illuminating that the “neutral intervention” of the United States in to the war between
Spain and Cuba was intended to end the claims of Spanish and Cuban sovereignty
while asserting U.S. dominance in the region).
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protections are integral to the base after the War of 1898, and Subsection
III.C offers a cultural reading of its role in supporting American
superiority. Part IV concludes by identifying how this history, in terms of
space, markets, and culture, reflects a condition of “outside and inside” in
the United States.
II. EMPIRE IN TERRITORIAL EXPANSION, WEALTH-CREATION, AND
CULTURAL SUPERIORITY
To contextualize why the United States established and maintained a
base in Cuba after 1898, this Part provides a working definition of empire.
Exploring the theory of empire and the history behind the base
accomplishes three things. First, it explains why an overseas presence was
needed militarily, economically, and geopolitically, and how this required
anomaly. Second, the base shaped normative reasoning in international
law (i.e., sovereignty and imperial influence for the United States, Spain,
and Cuba), American law (i.e., checks or deference for political authority in
foreign relations, economic policy, and territorial acquisition), and Cuban
law (i.e., Cuba’s constitution and treaties with the United States). Third,
this begins to paint a picture of how culture, economics, and political
change helped craft the law’s role in GTMO’s anomaly and American
extraterritoriality. These assumptions appear in how the law―individual
rights, public obligations and constitutional ordering―facilitated these
relations. These insights motivate Part III’s methodology of pinpointing
how the law reinforced the United States’ imperial role in GTMO’s past.
Colás explains that empires require “combinations of territorial
organization, modes of wealth-creation and distribution, and dynamics of
cultural self-understanding.”32 In Empire, he offers a conceptual and
comparative analysis of empires in world history to identify specific modes
of social organization that result in a state “that successfully expands from
a metropolitan [center] across various territories in order to dominate
diverse populations.”33 Essential to this analysis is identifying what factors
influence
the
development
of
metropolitan/center
and
periphery/subordinate relationships reflective of an empire. By examining
diverse empires such as Rome after 27 B.C., Han China from 24-220 A.D.,
Spain after 1492, the fourteenth century Ottoman Empire, and the late
nineteenth century British empire, Colás identifies three features required
by empire: “empire as space,” “empire as market,” and “empire as
culture.”34

32. See COLÁS, supra note 23, at 5.
33. See id. at 28.
34. Id.
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First, empires need borders that are neither closed nor limited, but are
boundless and benefit from sophisticated notions of what is “inside” and
“outside.”35 The opposite would be a sovereign state with finite borders
and without control over another population’s sovereignty. Empires have
“frontiers and boundaries, but no external borders,” 36 and these frontiers
act as “fluctuating zone[s] of interaction between the imperial centre and its
peripheries.”37 In order to justify how empires govern populations outside
the metropole and control territory outside the domestic, empires require
these flexible borders. Empires develop ornate political and legal
instruments delineating what is outside and inside.38
Jurisprudence on overseas authority, such as GTMO detention cases39 or
the Insular Cases,40 offer a sophisticated way to demarcate an empire’s
borders. This facilitates empire as space. When imperial governments face
protracted litigation in locations near the boundaries of governmental
authority overseas, the judiciary becomes a conduit for negotiating the
values implicit in overseas authority.41 These disputes develop at
geographic locations where sovereign authority changes or political
boundaries are demarcated, such as GTMO.
Second, empires use markets (the exchange of land, labor, and goods) to
exploit the periphery for the center’s economic benefit.42 Empires develop
elaborate administrative, legal, political, and military infrastructure to
secure this.43 This capacity to move enormous quantities of resources,
people, and ideas and to conduct state administration with consistency is
impressive. The relationship between “empire as space” and “empire as
markets” is mutually reinforcing and guarantees control of territory and
35.
36.
37.
38.
39.
40.

See id. at 19.
See id.
See id. at 29.
See id. at 21.
See generally Hernández-López, Legal Black Hole, supra note 23.
See infra III:C. See generally BARTHOLOMEW H. SPARROW, THE INSULAR
CASES AND THE EMERGENCE OF AMERICAN EMPIRE 215 (2006) (characterizing
congressional action and Supreme Court decisions during this era to have created new
classifications for territories which allowed the United States to hold territories “at
arm’s length, apart from the American polity”).
41. This perspective follows the paths set by Lauren Benton. See generally
LAUREN BENTON, LAW AND COLONIAL CULTURES: LEGAL REGIMES IN WORLD
HISTORY, 1400-1900 (2002); Lauren Benton, Constitutions and Empires, 31 LAW &
SOC. INQUIRY 177 (2006); Lauren Benton, Colonial Law and Cultural Difference:
Jurisdictional Politics and the Formations of the Colonial State, 41 COMP. STUD.
SOC’Y & HISTORY 563-88 (1999). Similarly, Nasser Hussain draws similar analogies.
See NASSER HUSSAIN, THE JURISPRUDENCE OF EMERGENCY: COLONIALISM AND THE
RULE OF LAW (2003); Nasser Hussain, Beyond Norm and Exception: Guantánamo, 33
CRITICAL INQUIRY 734 (2007).
42. COLÁS, supra note 23, at 71.
43. Id.
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resources.
Empires secure long-distance markets not just through
exploitation overseas, but also by systems of taxation, customs duties,
privateering, and monopolies with specific public and private law
instruments.44 The ways empires employ market protections, be they for
gold, oil, labor, manufactured goods, or control of sea or land, is key to
their control over these markets.
Third, empires develop cultural understandings, often racial, gendered,
or religious, to justify why a metropolitan power subordinates and controls
populations.45 Empires require a collective cultural identity, which
provides reasoning for why one population is subordinate and/or why
another is superior. Colás highlights how empires use the notion of
civilization and the process of racialization to justify authority.46 These
concepts identify a person’s place in the imperial order. Imperial authority
must classify or make ornate and distinct delineations between racial
groups. These distinctions may result in contradictions, such as claiming
universal liberal rights or popular sovereignty while preserving race-based
Establishing collective identities and communal
exclusions.47
understandings about how the larger world is organized is key to preserving
the empire.
By examining how empires configure their territorial organization, use
markets to sustain overseas rule, and develop cultural understandings,
Colás adds to traditional definitions of empires.48 This approach avoids
examinations that may be solely material or cultural.49 Stated in simple
terms, culture, economics, and political organization are all influential for
empire. Colás’ focus on three features highlights how material (i.e.,
markets and state involvement), political (i.e., geographic organization of
authority), and cultural (i.e., collective understanding of the larger world)
aspects all contribute to empire. Critical scholars comment on how a mere
cultural analysis overlooks material concerns, such as class, access to
capital or resources, political power, poverty, modes of production, and
44.
45.
46.
47.
48.

See id.
See id. at 29-30, 116-57.
See id. at 26.
See id. at 128.
See id. at 11 (referring to Michael Doyle’s definition of an empire as “a
relationship, formal or informal, in which one state controls the effective political
sovereignty of another political society”); see also, MICHAEL W. DOYLE, EMPIRES 45
(1986) (asserting that empire is both a formal and informal relationship by which one
state establishes sovereignty over another). Edward Said defines imperialism as “the
practice, the theory, and the attitudes of a dominating metropolitan center ruling a
distant territory.” Said distinguishes this from colonialism which is a consequence of
empire “implanting settlements in distant territory.” EDWARD SAID, CULTURE AND
IMPERIALISM 9 (1993).
49. C.f. Susan Marks, Empire’s Law, 10 IND. J. GLOBAL LEGAL STUD. 449 (2003)
(emphasizing the cultural, economic, and political aspects of empire).
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commerce.50 Similar criticisms are made about scholarship focusing solely
on economic and material concerns, while overlooking how race, gender,
religion, identity, and communal values influence empire or law’s
normativity.51 This Essay is influenced by LatCrit’s historic engagement
with examining not only how empire creates racial divisions and
essentialized narratives, but also in its examination of history’s influence in
lawmaking, transnationalism, and regional foci on borderlands, the
Caribbean, or the American West.52
For the 19th and 20th centuries, U.S. foreign relations in the Western
Hemisphere are often described as the story of empire-building, referring
to: continental expansion conquering Mexican and Native-American
territory before the Civil War; extension beyond the continent after 1898
50. See, e.g., Devon W. Carbado & Mitu Gulati, The Law and Economics of
Critical Race Theory, 112 YALE L.J. 1757 (2003) (reviewing CROSSROADS,
DIRECTIONS, AND A NEW CRITICAL RACE THEORY (Francisco Valdes et al., eds., 2002));
Richard Delgado, Crossroads and Blind Alleys: A Critical Examination of Recent
Writing About Race, 82 TEX. L. REV. 121 (2003) (reviewing CROSSROADS,
DIRECTIONS, AND A NEW CRITICAL RACE THEORY (Francisco Valdes et al., eds.) (2002)
and DERRICK BELL, ETHICAL AMBITION: LIVING A LIFE OF MEANING AND WORTH
(2002)). But see Angela P. Harris, The Jurisprudence of Reconstruction, 82 CAL. L.
REV. 741, 771-74 (1994); Kevin R. Johnson, Roll Over Beethoven: “A Critical
Examination of Recent Writing About Race”, 82 TEX. L. REV. 717 (2004).
51. See generally Patrick Wolfe, History and Imperialism: A Century of Theory,
from Marx to Postcolonialism, 102 AM. HIST. REV. 388 (1997) (describing how
theories of empire, with Marxist, dependency, post-colonial or globalization foci vary
between the significance attributed to material versus ideological or cultural
explanations).
52. See, e.g., GILBERT PAUL CARRASCO, LATINOS IN THE UNITED STATES:
INVITATION AND EXILE, IN IMMIGRANTS OUT! THE NEW NATIVISM AND THE ANTIIMMIGRANT IMPULSE IN THE UNITED STATES 190 (Juan F. Perea ed., 1997); Keith Aoki,
One Hundred Years of Solitude: The Alternate Futures of LatCrit Theory, 54 RUTGERS
L. REV. 1031 (2002); José A. Cabranes, Citizenship and the American Empire, 127 U.
PA. L. REV. 391 (1978); Antonia Darder, Schooling and the Empire of Capital:
Unleashing the Contradictions, 50 VILL. L. REV. 847, 847 (2005); Berta HernandezTruyol, Angela Harris & Francisco Valdes, Beyond The First Decade: A ForwardLooking History Of Latcrit Theory, Community And Praxis, 17 BERKELEY LA RAZA
L.J. 169 (2006); Pedro A. Malavet, The Past, Present and Future of the Puerto RicoU.S. Colonial Relationship: Vieques, Transculturation, and Reparations: Reparations
Theory and Postcolonial Puerto Rico: Some Preliminary Thoughts, 13 BERKELEY LA
RAZA L.J. 387 (2002); Pedro A. Malavet, Puerto Rico: Cultural Nation, American
Colony, 6 MICH. J. RACE & L. 1 (2000); Ediberto Román, Empire Forgotten: The
United States’s Colonization of Puerto Rico, 42 VILL. L. REV. 1119 (1997); Ediberto
Román & Theron Simmons, Membership Denied: Subordination and Subjugation
Under United States Expansionism, 39 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 437 (2002); Ediberto
Román, Reparations and the Colonial Dilemma: The Insurmountable Hurdles and Yet
Transformative Benefits, 13 BERKELEY LA RAZA L.J. 369 (2002); E. San Juan, Jr.,
Post-Colonialism and the Question of Nation-State Violence, 78 DENV. U. L. REV. 887
(2001); Charles R. Venator Santiago, Foreword: Countering Kulturkampf Politics
Through Critique And Justice Pedagogy, 50 VILL. L. REV. 749 (2005); Sylvia R. Lazos
Vargas, History, Legal Scholarship, and LatCrit Theory: The Case of Racial
Transformations Circa the Spanish American War, 1896-1900, 78 DENV. U. L. REV.
921 (2001).
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with the colonies of Puerto Rico, Guam, the Virgin Islands, and the
Philippines; 20th century military interventions, protectorates, and
investments in Cuba, Nicaragua, the Dominican Republic, Panama,
Honduras, and Mexico and the acquisition of Pacific colonies in Samoa,
Northern Mariana Islands, Micronesia, Marshall Islands, and Palau; Cold
War efforts against economic nationalism and “soviet influence;” and the
effectively forced implementation of neo-liberal economic policies, such as
the Washington Consensus, in the 1990s. Since few of these examples
reflect de jure American control of a population, these identifications
require conceptual frameworks of empire as something other than formal
colonialism.
Scholarship on U.S. foreign relations as empire provides rich and varied
analytical frameworks, inspiring questions about how law and empirebuilding mutually re-enforce one another. William Appleman Williams
presented the “Tragedy of American Diplomacy” as how economic
objectives, coupled with the military means to enforce these objectives, and
a willingness to impose American ideals abroad, masked foreign policy
“neutrality,” initiated with the “Open Door” policy of the 1890s.53 The
idea that economic frontiers were “no longer coextensive” with territorial
frontiers encapsulated Williams’ perspective on why American empire
expanded during the fall of formal European colonialism and consequent
decolonization, two world wars, and a Cold War.54
The United States expansion after 1898 was motivated by perceived
necessity to find overseas markets; alliances between private and public
interests; ideologies on frontiers, jingoism, Anglo-superiority, and
protestant missionaries; and the need to participate in global imperial
competition.55 The United States did not fight the War of 189856 for
humanitarian objectives, such as an independent Cuba, spreading
democracy, or even the discredited myth of “Remember the Maine,” but

53. See generally WILLIAM APPLEMAN WILLIAMS, THE TRAGEDY OF AMERICAN
DIPLOMACY (Norton 2009) (1988).
54. Lloyd C. Gardner, Foreword, to id.
55. See also DAVID HEALY, U.S. EXPANSIONISM: THE IMPERIALIST URGE IN THE
1890S 48 (1970) (describing how ideas on markets, China, virtue, civilization, race,
barbarism, commerce, etc. inspired public and political discourse seeking an empire)
[hereinafter HEALY, EXPANSIONISM]. See generally WALTER LAFEBER, THE NEW
EMPIRE: AN INTERPRETATION OF AMERICAN EXPANSION, 1860-1898 (1998) [hereinafter
LAFEBER, NEW EMPIRE].
56. This Essay prefers the term “War of 1898” versus the Spanish-American War,
since the War encompassed much more than just Spain and the United States. See
generally Sylvia L. Hilton, Democracy Beats the “Disaster” Complex: Spanish
Interpretations of the Colonial Crisis, 12 OAH MAG. HIST., 11-17 (1998); Thomas G.
Paterson, U.S. Intervention in Cuba, 1898: Interpreting the Spanish- American-CubanFilipino War, 12 OAH MAG. HIST. 5 (1998).
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instead for economic and diplomatic self-interests overseas.57 Emily
Rosenberg describes how American economic values and culture inspired
its goal of expansion and conformity abroad from 1890 through 1945.58
After the Cold War, literary, post-colonial, gender, and American studies
influences intensified the examination of empire. Amy Kaplan and Donald
E. Pease in Cultures of United States Imperialism presented the concept
that empire was heavily absent in American culture and that gender, race,
and class, as cultural constructions, contested imperial projects throughout
foreign relations history.59 Ann Laura Stoler suggests examining how
United States empire influences the “intimate aspects of life,” such as “sex,
sentiment, domestic, arrangement, and child rearing.”60 These various
perspectives illuminate empire’s influence in American history.
Often to identify empire’s influence, one must isolate how current
perspectives and present contexts frame how that past is presented. As
Dipesh Chakrabarty explains the vital task is to read history against its
grain and to identify how current law and international relations reflect
prior contests.61 For this Essay, most vivid in this regard are the varying
interpretations of the War of 1898, the Platt Amendment, GTMO’s creation
and occupation, the Cuban Revolution of 1959, and Cold War in the
Americas.62

57. See generally Walter LaFeber, The American Search for Opportunity, in
HISTORY OF AMERICAN FOREIGN RELATIONS VOL. II, 234-35 (Warren I. Cohen ed.,
1993) [hereinafter LaFeber, Opportunity].
58. See generally EMILY S. ROSENBERG, SPREADING THE AMERICAN DREAM:
AMERICAN ECONOMIC & CULTURAL EXPANSION 1890-1945 (1982).
59. See AMY KAPLAN & DONALD E. PEASE, Introduction to CULTURES OF UNITED
STATES IMPERIALISM 3 (Amy Kaplan & Donald Pease eds., 1993).
60. Ann Laura Stoler, Tense and Tender Ties: The Politics of Comparison in North
American History and (Post) Colonial Studies, in HAUNTED BY EMPIRE: GEOGRAPHIES
OF INTIMACY IN NORTH AMERICAN HISTORY 23 (Ann Laura Stoler ed., 2006)
61. See
generally DIPESH CHAKRABARTY, PROVINCIALIZING EUROPE:
POSTCOLONIAL THOUGHT AND HISTORICAL DIFFERENCE 42-43 (2000) (arguing history
should be examined by not prioritizing European or “modern perspectives” and thereby
ignoring voices from the “periphery”).
62. See generally CLOSE ENCOUNTERS OF EMPIRE: WRITING THE CULTURAL
HISTORY OF U.S.-LATIN AMERICAN RELATIONS (Gilbert M. Joseph et al. eds., 1998); IN
FROM THE COLD: LATIN AMERICA’S NEW ENCOUNTER WITH THE COLD WAR (Gilbert M.
Joseph et al. eds., 2008); LOUIS A. PÉREZ JR., THE WAR OF 1898: THE UNITED STATES &
CUBA IN HISTORY & HISTORIOGRAPHY (1998).
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III. GTMO’S PAST: A BASE FOR EMPIRE’S SPACE, MARKETS, AND
CULTURE
A. Expanding Space and Flexible Borders with the Platt Amendment and
Insular Cases
With base territory severed from legal obligations implicit in
sovereignty, GTMO expands American authority by distancing the base
from checks in Cuban, American, and international law. GTMO supports
expansion with flexible and adaptable control, reflecting “empire as space.”
The base itself, in addition to legal interpretations of extraterritorial
authority, provides flexibility vital to military control of an overseas
location. The base becomes space outside the domestic continent but
within American control. The United States needed expansion and flexible
control for this first overseas base to protect its regional influence,
territorial acquisitions, and regional investments. As U.S. foreign policy
relied less on military intervention and Cold War anxieties were born,
flexibility bolstered the base’s role in patrolling Cuba and the region.
Recently, this flexible control has supported a policy of detention distanced
from checks known to apply domestically and in third states. Serving
foreign policy missions, American foreign relations have capitalized on
GTMO’s anomaly for over a century, choosing the base because of its
location and legal malleability. Base anomaly is expressed in American
law on extraterritoriality.63
American judicial interpretations of the Constitution and international
law in the Insular Cases (1901-1920), which concern the spoils of the War
of 1898, including extraterritorial governance of Guam, Puerto Rico, and
the Philippines, point to this flexibility in extraterritorial authority. These
cases affirm flexible control overseas in two ways. First, they endorse
overseas authority.64 The locations in question are not part of any state
within the United States.
This severs popular sovereignty and
constitutional authority from territorial control and supports political
authority with limited rights protections. Second, these cases clarify that
when governing overseas, congressional authority and Executive
enforcement, i.e., the political branches, are less encumbered.65 The
military in GTMO or customs collection in the Insular Cases may operate

63. See KAL RAUSTIALA, DOES THE CONSTITUTION FOLLOW THE FLAG?: THE
EVOLUTION OF TERRITORIALITY IN AMERICAN LAW 6 (2009) (explaining that
extraterritoriality, through colonialism or state-consent and with military or regulatory
objectives, may serve to manage legal differences between sovereignties).
64. See SPARROW, supra note 40, at 215 (characterizing the decisions in the Insular
Cases as an endorsement of the United States’ emergence as an international power).
65. Id.

http://digitalcommons.wcl.american.edu/jgspl/vol18/iss3/6

14

HERNÁNDEZ-LÓPEZ 08/06/2010

11/9/2010 7:21:13 PM

Hernández-López: Guantánamo as Outside and Inside the U.S.: Why is a Base a Legal

2010]

GUANTÁNAMO AS INSIDE AND OUTSIDE THE U.S.

485

free from many domestic constitutional checks.
The United States occupied Cuba from 1898 to 1902. Then the Platt
Amendment, included in the Cuban Constitution and the 1903 Reciprocity
Treaty, checked Cuban sovereignty and facilitated American interference in
Cuban sovereign powers such as foreign relations, economic debt, and
territorial integrity. The Amendment required Cuba to sell or lease lands to
the United States for a base, which resulted in GTMO.66 Avoiding
constitutional checks and tempering foreign sovereignty, the Platt
Amendment, like the Insular Cases, justified and supported “empire as
space,” by providing flexible legal reasoning to expand authority
geographically. LaFeber describes the Amendment as “neatly solving the
political burdens or the economic competition” implicit in annexation while
also allowing Cuban independence and providing GTMO as a “safeguard
for American interests in the Caribbean.”67
While the Insular Cases do not completely sever the Constitution from
overseas authority, their doctrine implicitly endorses flexible control
overseas. American authority may expand geographically, fostering
geopolitical and economic objectives, without legal limits applied
domestically. Flexibility appears in the Incorporation Doctrine, the
distinction of fundamental rights from individual rights protections, and the
functional-based test for deciding what constitutional provisions apply. All
of these legitimize authority overseas and, more importantly, provide legal
justification for extending control with fewer limits than for domestic
authority.
The Supreme Court began crafting a constitutional doctrine flexible
enough to support overseas authority in De Lima v. Bidwell68 in 1901, the
first of the Insular Cases. While these cases initially addressed taxation
and tariffs and, later, individual civil and criminal rights, they provide a
sustained judicial interpretation on extraterritoriality sanctioning expansion.
They regard the political issue of whether the Constitution applies overseas
to territories within American sovereignty that were not states, not
contiguous to the states, and not destined for statehood. The political
dilemma posed is: does the Constitution follow the flag? This was a matter
of extreme importance since American political identity was built on
certain premises, including that the Constitution was the source of political
authority, limited government, checks and balances between branches, and

66. An Act Making Appropriations for the Support of the Army for the Fiscal Year
Ending June 13, 1902, ch. 803, para. VII, 31 Stat. 895, 898 (1902), Arts. I, II, III, IV,
and VII (limiting Cuban foreign relations and economic powers and requiring Cuba
provide a foreign base within its territory).
67. See LAFEBER NEW EMPIRE, supra note 55, at 416.
68. 182 U.S. 1, 2 (1901).
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that individuals governed were represented by the Constitution and the
institutions and laws it created. Somehow, separating the Constitution
(legal rule used in the states) from the flag (American sovereignty) would
be a remarkable change in legal thinking. To avoid this, flexibility was
needed. It permitted authority to expand geographically yet conceptually
inside American legality.
With the Insular Cases, the Court did not fully separate overseas
authority from the Constitution. Its flexible approach was to find that the
Constitution was operative extraterritorially but that not all provisions had
full effect in unincorporated territories, such as those not planned to
become states, unlike continental territories that became states. This
approach became the Incorporation Doctrine, providing a conceptual line to
determine when all or some constitutional provisions had effect. The Court
reasoned that provisions that “withheld all power” from Congress did
apply. 69 The Uniformity Clause,70 which seeks uniform revenue
collection, did not apply to tariffs from Puerto Rican imports.71 The Court
held that only “fundamental” individual rights applied in Puerto Rico and
the Philippines and that trial by jury was not such a right.72 The Insular
Cases supported an adaptable and less formal reading of constitutionalism,
permitting policymakers to increasingly govern overseas possessions.
The flexibility was doctrinal. Owen Fiss described Justice White’s
decision in Downes as “disruptive and somewhat out of character.” He
added that the decision resulted in a balancing of “constitutive” theories
prioritizing enumerated governmental powers and territorial acquisitions,
congressional freedom and checks, and imperial impulses and their
dissidents. However, Fiss noted that the decision lacked specific
definitions and had an “occult” quality.73 The decision’s flexibility reflects
a national identity. Christina Burnett explains that the Insular Cases
provided the nation with a temporary way to govern and, if needed,
relinquish the territories.74 American society was apprehensive of more
69. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8 (providing Congress with the power to “collect
Taxes, Duties, Imposts and Excises . . . but all Duties, Imposts and Excises shall be
uniform throughout the United States”).
70. See id.
71. See Downes v. Bidwell, 182 U.S. 244, 277-78 (1901) (describing the inquiry
necessary to determine the meaning of uniform).
72. See Balzac v. Porto Rico, 258 U.S. 298, 310, 312-13 (1922) (affirming that
constitutional due process does apply to Puerto Rico and the Philippines; although the
Insular Cases affirmed that only some of the Constitution did apply, the Court
reasoned that Congress could statutorily provide for many of these same rights).
73. Owen M. Fiss, The American Empire?, in HISTORY OF THE SUPREME COURT OF
THE UNITED STATES, VOL. VIII: TROUBLED BEGINNINGS OF THE MODERN STATE, 18881910 245 (Stanley N. Katz ed., 1993) (noting that White’s “genius for compromise,”
which qualified him for the chief justiceship, was not manifest in this decision).
74. Christina Duffy Burnett, United States: American Expansion and Territorial
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territorial extensions, colonies, and consequent political or military
responses such as the Civil War or Reconstruction. Plenary powers over
new territorial acquisitions provided the United States with a legal
construct to exclude non-Anglo-Saxon cultures from full constitutional and
sovereign protections.75 The Insular Cases provided the legal justifications
for “empire as space.”
B. A Base Protects Regional Markets and Global Power After 1898
Strategically placed, GTMO’s location explains how a military outpost
instrumentally protected American markets overseas. At the eastern end of
Cuba’s south coast and next to a major Caribbean entryway, GTMO has
served “empire as markets.” First, it provided regional, geopolitical, and
naval protection, serving American foreign policy in the Caribbean and
Central America. Following 1898, referred to as the “Gunboat” and
“Dollar” diplomacy periods,76 American economic objectives overseas
were to find and protect new markets, particularly in terms of supply
markets for domestic consumption and demand markets for American
services and products.
At an overseas base, the first for the United States, naval ships could
refuel, receiving coal without returning to domestic ports or finding a
friendly foreign port.77 The U.S. Navy could patrol waters far from
domestic shores but close to essential sea paths and territorial and
economic disputes in the Caribbean and Central America.78 With such
Deannexation, 72 U. CHI. L. REV. 797 (2005).
75. See EDIBERTO ROMÁN, THE OTHER AMERICAN COLONIES: AN INTERNATIONAL
AND CONSTITUTIONAL LAW EXAMINATION OF THE UNITED STATES’ NINETEENTH AND
TWENTIETH CENTURY ISLAND CONQUESTS (2006) (presenting how Downes limitations
regarding “Anglo-Saxon principles” on government were applied to territories after
Puerto Rico); Efrén Rivera Ramos, The Legal Construction of American Colonialism:
The Insular Cases (1901-1922) 65 REV. JUR. U.P.R. 225, 284-92 (1996) (relating
Insular Cases jurisprudence and colonial governance with contemporary and pre-1898
racist ideology); see also Vargas, supra note 52, at 933-42 (presenting how the War of
1898 was vital to law and race, then and now).
76. See EMILY S. ROSENBERG, FINANCIAL MISSIONARIES TO THE WORLD: THE
POLITICS AND CULTURE OF DOLLAR DIPLOMACY, 1900-1930 (1999) (describing U.S.
foreign policies during the “Dollar Diplomacy” period, seeking American management
of foreign states’ financial and economic policies, spreading American values, and
avoiding military interventions or empire if possible, and providing a base for the
Bretton Woods system).
77. See SPARROW, supra note 40, at 65 (describing Alfred Thayer Mahan’s view
that a stronger navy requires new naval refueling stations); see also LaFeber, Lion,
supra note 25, at 714 (1986) (relating American foreign policy after 1898 with Alfred
Thayer Mahan’s naval power theories, constitutional reinterpretation, and centralized
of military power).
78. See Robert Freeman Smith, Latin America, the United States and the European
Powers, 1830-1930, in THE CAMBRIDGE HISTORY OF LATIN AMERICA, VOL. IV c. 18701930 83, 94-95 (Leslie Bethell ed. 1984) (identifying the military and economic vitality
of the area).
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stations, American naval power competed with European navies.79 These
military capabilities protected U.S. interests abroad, such as economic
investments and territorial acquisitions, and provided realpolitik influence
with world powers and neighboring states.80 France, the United Kingdom,
Netherlands, and Denmark exerted economic influence and/or de jure
political control in the hemisphere, while Germany and Japan increasingly
looked to the region to supply primary materials.81 Since the early
nineteenth century, American foreign objectives in the region were to
contain and exclude European interference. GTMO also facilitated keeping
an eye on the Cuban protectorate.82
Public debates during this period, before and after 1898, illustrate the
significance of overseas markets for the U.S. economy, national identity,
and American politics.83 Overseas economics and their impact on daily life
fueled public discourse. Debates included the following topics: silver
versus gold as the currency standard; whether the Constitution follow the
flag; “imperialists” versus “anti-imperialists;” populist and rural interests
versus industrialists and urbanites; and civilizing missions in interventions
in the Philippines, Cuba, China, the Dominican Republic, Haiti, Nicaragua,
and Mexico. Both geopolitics (control of locations territorial or oceanic)
and economics (need for supply and demand markets) fueled these debates.
Domestic perspectives on the importance of overseas markets explain a
significant part of American motives to enter the War of 1898. The United
States’ interests in Cuba and the Dominican Republic had been developing
for decades. In April 1898, the United States declared war on Spain, with
79. Cf. MICHAEL J. STRAUSS, THE LEASING OF GUANTANAMO BAY 4-40 (2009)
(describing how world powers used leases, such as in extraterritorial bases or ports, to
exert economic and military influence overseas); George Grafton Wilson, Leased
Territories, 34 AM. J. INT’L L. 703 (1940) (examining how leases permitted world
powers a way to avoid sovereign control overseas but exercise influence, with
examples of American leases in Cuba, Panama, and Nicaragua and leases of other
states in Asia and Africa).
80. LaFeber argues that the United States regarded its control of Guantánamo,
Hawai’i and the Philippines “as [a] strategic means” to protect economic objectives.
See LAFEBER, NEW EMPIRE, supra note 55, at 411.
81. See, e.g., id. at 98 (“The United States was not the only country taking an
increased interest in Latin America at the turn of the century.”).
82. Cf. DAVID F. HEALY, THE UNITED STATES IN CUBA 1898-1902: GENERALS,
POLITICIANS, AND THE SEARCH FOR POLICY (1963); PETER MACALISTER-SMITH, 3
ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW 382 (1992) (describing Guantánamo’s
creation during U.S. imperialism and how bases were the “starting point of colonial
expansion”); Kal Raustiala, The Geography of Justice, 73 FORDHAM L. REV. 2501,
2535, 2545 (2005) (describing the base’s creation and its lease terms as “remnants of
the age of empire”).
83. See DAVID M. PLETCHER, THE DIPLOMACY OF TRADE AND INVESTMENT:
AMERICAN ECONOMIC EXPANSION IN THE HEMISPHERE, 1865-1900 (1998) (presenting
the importance of business and economic interests in supporting American expansion,
highlighting that these concerns were not uniform or systematically planned in favor of
empire).
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President McKinley urging reluctant members of Congress that overseas
events were intimate to American security and prosperity.84 By year’s end,
the United States had troops in China protecting Western investments
threatened by the Boxer rebellion, colonial possession of Puerto Rico,
Guam, and the Philippines, occupation authority in Cuba, and secure
possession of Hawai’i. The Untied States possessed territories in Asia, the
Pacific Ocean, and the Caribbean Sea, establishing military capabilities in
all of these regions. With this military, territorial, and economic power, the
United States competed with empires of the day.
The domestic push for such decisive expansion by 1898 is explained in
economic and geopolitical motives.85 Dramatic economic growth and
domestic industrialization led to a series of recessions after 1873, caused by
new technologies in transport, power, and mechanization disrupting diverse
economic sectors. Steam power, coal, iron, steel, railroads, factories, and
oceanic shipping made myriad economic activities more efficient and
productive. Expanded commercial influence brought goods and services to
populations and locations that previously had limited economic access.
More traditional and less modern practices were displaced by
industrialization, commercialization, and new ease in transport. The social
and political effects of these economic crises were strikes, riots, and
popular mobilization. Public discourse repeatedly commented on and
expressed how all these changes affected domestic life, whether it was in
depressed agrarian sectors or congested urban economies.86
The most serious crisis was the Panic of 1893, which lasted three years.87
It was feared that industrialization led to oversupply and insufficient
domestic demand markets for products. Speculation bubbles in railroads
and financing resulted in impressive shocks to capital supply and labor
sources throughout the United States, leading to bank runs, falling
agriculture sales, and population pushes westward in search of

84. See LaFeber, Opportunity, supra note 57, at 144.
85. See Thomas McCormick, From Old Empire to New: The Changing Dynamics

and Tactics of American Empire, in COLONIAL CRUCIBLE: EMPIRE IN THE MAKING OF
THE MODERN AMERICAN STATE, 63, 66-74 (Alfred W. McCoy & Francisco A. Scarano
eds., 2009) (describing how economic changes, financial panics in 1873, 1884, and
1893, and socio-economic unrest contributed to a general sentiment supporting
empire).
86. See generally Emily Rosenberg, SPREADING THE AMERICAN DREAM:
AMERICAN ECONOMIC AND CULTURAL EXPANSION, 1890-1945 (1982) [hereinafter
ROSENBERG, SPREADING THE AMERICAN DREAM]; Walter LaFeber, The American View
of Decolonization, 1776-1920: An Ironic Legacy, in THE UNITED STATES AND
DECOLONIZATION: POWER AND FREEDOM 30 (David Ryan & Victor Pungong eds.,
2000); LaFeber, Opportunity, supra note 57; LAFEBER, NEW EMPIRE, supra note 55, at
408; William Appleman Williams, A Survey of Territory, reprinted in A WILLIAM
APPLEMAN WILLIAMS READER 276 (Henry W. Berger ed., 1992).
87. See LaFeber, Opportunity, supra note 57, at 103.
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employment. These disruptions, primarily over-production caused by
modernization, were seen as causing the Panic, leaving a lasting impression
on political discourse of the period.
Overseas markets were presented as ameliorating these problems by
securing access and international influence amidst rising global tensions.
International markets included demand for American products and services
and supply for domestic consumption and production.88 To continue with
the pace of production, American industrialists and financial interests
eagerly sought new markets.89 Protectionism abroad, in the form of
domestic or imperial authority, invariably limited American access to many
locations.90
Foreign policies were needed to open new markets.91 This could be
achieved with a range of options, such as territorial control, diplomatic
negotiation and agreement, and military power. Latin America, mostly the
Caribbean and Central America, became the United States’s “sphere of
influence.” European empires in the region were decreasing after 1898,
and many states in the region had been formally independent since the midnineteenth century. Because they lacked capital for large industrial or
commercial projects, they became attractive prospects for American
interests in agriculture, mining, financial services, and railroads.92
Geopolitics of the period spurred expansionary motives. Americans

88. See LAFEBER, NEW EMPIRE, supra note 55, at 408 (describing that American
interests in expansion were primarily to “acquire markets for the glut of goods pouring
out of highly mechanized factories and farms,” which “differed fundamentally” from
European empires).
89. See HEALY, EXPANSIONISM, supra note 55, at 159-69 (describing the “glut”
theory of overproduction and how overseas markets in China, Europe, or Latin
America could offset this economic crisis).
90. See SPARROW, supra note 40, at 57-59, 64-69 (explaining that American
economic expansion faced the problems of tariff’s prohibitive costs and this influenced
U.S. imperialists to seek the attainment of more territorial possessions and avoid legal
checks on commerce).
91. See McCormick, supra note 85 at 74-77 (A great deal of American foreign
economic policy efforts focused on “open door,” in theory permitting investors not just
from an imperial state but from any country to benefit from equal access to foreign
markets.).
92. Cf. GREG GRANDIN, EMPIRE’S WORKSHOP: LATIN AMERICA, THE UNITED
STATES, AND THE RISE OF NEW IMPERIALISM 11-33 (2006) (examining the economic
and geopolitical motives of U.S. foreign policy in the Caribbean and Central America
in the early twentieth century); JOHN MASON HART, EMPIRE AND REVOLUTION: THE
AMERICANS IN MEXICO SINCE THE CIVIL WAR (2002) (providing a detailed and
exhaustive analysis of American influence, economic and political, in Mexico); JOSEPH
ET AL., CLOSE ENCOUNTERS OF EMPIRE, supra note 62 (offering a series of essays
describing various examples of U.S.-Latin American relations from diverse regions in
Latin America); Robert Freeman Smith, Latin America, the United States and the
European Powers, 1830-1930, in THE CAMBRIDGE HISTORY OF LATIN AMERICA, VOL.
IV c. 1870 to 1930 (Leslie Bethell ed., 1984) (describing how the United States
increased its influence in the region after 1898 while European influence decreased).

http://digitalcommons.wcl.american.edu/jgspl/vol18/iss3/6

20

HERNÁNDEZ-LÓPEZ 08/06/2010

11/9/2010 7:21:13 PM

Hernández-López: Guantánamo as Outside and Inside the U.S.: Why is a Base a Legal

2010]

GUANTÁNAMO AS INSIDE AND OUTSIDE THE U.S.

491

favoring expansion, known as “imperialists,” viewed the continent and the
domestic market as insufficient to supply the resources for a modern
economy or to meet the demands of what could be produced.93 Overseas
markets were needed for these and because they were disappearing in their
own right, U.S. expansion was desperately needed. Historically powerful
European empires such as Great Britain and France, along with emerging
powers like Germany, Russia, and Japan jockeyed around the globe to
secure territorial and oceanic control.
Global resources supplying
industrialization and modern consumption were regarded as limited. Late
nineteenth century and early twentieth century wars across the Middle East,
Africa, and Central, South, and East Asia presented opportunities to secure
control of overseas markets. In the eyes of domestic imperialists, the
United States was in a particularly vulnerable position with territory limited
to the continent, excluding Alaska.
With its refueling function, GTMO intimately expresses “empire as
market.” Market protection motives led to the base when the United States
became Cuba’s protector. The base was the product of the economicallymotivated expansion in 1898 and the Platt Amendment, which required the
creation of the base three years later. GTMO supported naval and military
power needed for informal empire, as opposed to the base being part of a
formal overseas colony.94 As a base and refueling station, Guantánamo
represented a larger shift in overseas policies to focus on limited territorial
control of ports and bases in the service of naval power and patrolling sea
transportation.95 This facilitated commerce, secured ocean transports, and,
if needed, moved troops to peripheral locations.96 It reflected a twentieth
century focus on limited but strategic holdings to avoid the expense of
colonies and territorial acquisition overseas. Traditional colonial expenses
were increasingly draining, implying administrative, diplomatic, and
military costs. But the domestic benefits of colonies were mostly
geopolitical and economic. European and American interests in inter93. See SPARROW, supra note 40, at 68-69 (describing the revolution in economic
theory that viewed expansion as essential for the survival of American capitalism).
94. See John Gallagher & Ronald Robinson, The Imperialism of Free Trade, 6
ECON. HIST. REV. 1 (1953) (outlining the most influential analysis of how “free-trade”
policies sustain informal empires); Warren Kimball, Foreword to THE UNITED STATES
AND DECOLONIZATION: POWER AND FREEDOM XIV (David Ryan & Victor Pungong
eds., 2000) (describing the “informal empire” as allowing for “the exercise of power
without formal political control); see also William Roger Louis & Ronald Robinson,
The Imperialism of Decolonization, 22 J. IMPERIAL COMMONWEALTH HIST. 462, 495
(1994) (describing the rise of informal empire as the British empire falls and U.S.
power rises in the twentieth century).
95. See LAFEBER NEW EMPIRE, supra note 55, at 411 (presenting Guantánamo,
Hawai’i, and the Philippines as strategically important to protect American markets
overseas).
96. See SPARROW, supra note 40, at 65-69.
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oceanic canal projects, such as in Nicaragua, Panama, and the Sinai
Peninsula, reflected increasing geopolitical importance.
Overseas bases were key to informal empires. Informal imperialism
implied de jure independence or shared sovereignty of a nation but with
overwhelming economic and military influence from an imperial state.
This effectively forced unequal treaties and concessions from one state to
an imperial power. With troops stationed there, supporting naval power
and protecting markets, bases like GTMO were stepping-stones from
formal to informal empire.97
Providing the capacity to refuel, overseas bases served the new
technologies of iron steam ships, becoming military advantages for
industrialized nations. These power and shipping capacities had the
potential to take navies across the globe at much faster and reliable speeds,
but they required re-fueling. The leading proponent of naval power,
overseas bases, and their influence in commerce was Alfred Thayer
Mahan.98 Mahan predicted not only the geopolitical necessity of investing
in naval power and overseas bases but also the significant barrier the
Constitution posed for this.99 Overseas bases permitted navies to operate
far from home, providing protection for markets and geopolitical gains of
controlling strategic locations. Great Britain moved to lease or occupy
strategic locations, such as Hong Kong, Egypt, Gibraltar, Singapore, and
Arabian Peninsula ports, where the protection of intercontinental transport
was most needed.100 The United States did the same with GTMO, Puerto
Rico, the Virgin Islands, Panama, Hawai’i, the Philippines, Aleutian
Islands, and Guam, and temporarily with occupations in Haiti, the
Dominican Republic, and Nicaragua. Accordingly, as an overseas, base
GTMO protected American markets overseas, served informal empire’s
97. See id. at 233.
98. See id. at 65 (identifying Alfred Thayer Mahan as the most influential writer on

this subject, and advocating for increased naval power across the globe and the
acquisition of bases to support this power).
99. LaFeber, Lion, supra note 25, at 714 (explaining the historic precedent set by
President McKinley in which the president would intervene abroad despite not
receiving congressional authorization).
100. Cf. LAUREN BENTON, A SEARCH FOR SOVEREIGNTY: LAW AND GEOGRAPHY IN
EUROPEAN EMPIRES 1400-1900 (2010) (describing how European states developed
control of sea routes and strategic territorial locations to support their extraterritorial
control). For descriptions of the variety of leases, bases, protectorates, and semisovereign spaces of historic empires, see WILLIAM EDWARD HALL, A TREATISE ON
INTERNATIONAL LAW 30-31 (A. Pearce Higgins ed., 8th ed. 2001); MACALISTERSMITH, supra note 82 (describing overseas bases in international law); LASSA
OPPENHEIM, 1 INTERNATIONAL LAW: A TREATISE §§ 92-94 (H. Lauterpacht ed., 8th ed.
1955); id. § 94a (examining the British Commonwealth nations); Geddes W.
Rutherford, Spheres of Influence: An Aspect of Semi-Suzerainty, 20 AM. J. INT’L L. 300
(1926) (providing a survey and analysis of how “Spheres of Influence” are supported
by overseas bases and partial sovereignty with United Kingdom and American
examples).
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objective of geopolitical control without colonies, and reflected the cuttingedge in naval power.
C. GTMO’s Cultural Assumptions: Sovereignty Checked Indefinitely
GTMO reflects “empire as culture.” The base benefits from ideologies
of superiority, with cultural justifications for checking Cuban sovereignty.
These values frame legal anomaly, support American power, and avoid
sovereign obligations and Cuba’s sovereignty. With reasoning that nonAnglo and non-European populations could not be sovereign or selfgoverned, American policies checked Cuban sovereignty with the Platt
Amendment, military interventions, and the base. Legal instruments
creating Guantánamo, such as the Treaty of Paris to the 1934 U.S.-Cuba
treaty, limit Cuba’s de jure and territorial sovereignty.101
As Colás explains, empires use cultural understandings to justify how
metropolitan power subordinates populations abroad.
These
understandings classify populations based on race or between the civilized
and not civilized. Most obvious is that late nineteenth century notions of
cultural superiority fueled an emerging American national identity as a
world power and consequent regional interventions. While interventionist
foreign policies took on myriad forms, they relied on assumptions that
American values were needed or that self-interest required American
action. Various examples in the Western Hemisphere and in Asia show the
United States exercising its influence, military, realpolitik, and soft power
over foreign states.102
Values expressing superiority in terms of
democracy, liberalism, self-government, free trade, humanitarian duty, and
Protestantism shaped these policies.103
Cultural distinctions gained political significance as the American
empire grew in territory and population. Culture became extremely
importance for questions of imperial governance and domestic
imperialist/anti-imperialists debates. The reasoning of the Insular Cases
rested on assumptions that Puerto Ricans and Filipinos, because of their
culture, could not understand legal concepts, such as rights, from AngloSaxon culture.104 Cultural reasoning ordered how populations, territories,
101. See Christina Duffy Burnett, United States: American Expansion and
Territorial Deannexation, 72 U. CHI. L. REV. 797, 806 (2005).
102. See generally GREG GRANDIN, EMPIRE’S WORKSHOP: LATIN AMERICA, THE
UNITED STATES, AND THE RISE OF NEW IMPERIALISM (2006); LaFeber, Constitution,
supra note 25, at 695; LaFeber, Lion, supra note 25, at 714; Smith, supra note 78, 9294.
103. See generally ROSENBERG, SPREADING THE AMERICAN DREAM, supra note 86;
HEALY, EXPANSIONISM, supra note 55.
104. See Ramos, supra note 85, at 286 (describing the belief that the tropic region
was incapable of self-governance).
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and individuals were represented in American government.
U.S.
constitutionalism rested on principles such as states participating in the
determination of a central government with citizens voting for state and
federal leaders. The Platt Amendment and the Insular Cases effectively
separated American overseas power from de jure sovereign territory and
incorporation as states. Citizenship was correspondingly denied to
individuals from these periphery locations, as it was historically for Nativeand African-American populations.105
For empires, cultural reasoning offered similar adaptability in terms of
sovereignty and international law. Sovereignty was respected not only as
the final authority over a territory but also as an acknowledgment by other
sovereigns in the international system of sovereign status for that
authority.106 Certain populations, because of race, were deemed incapable
of being sovereign and were thus unrepresented and without protection in
the international system.107 Protection could be attained if a metropolitan
power colonized or established a protectorate over the population.108
Otherwise, these populations could be attacked or conquered under
international law. The delineation between sovereign and non-sovereign
was achieved by cultural distinction, distinguishing populations that were
not Christian, European, or Anglo (for the Western Hemisphere) as nonsovereign.
A state needed sovereignty to be independent in the
international system.
This legal discourse shaped the U.S.-Cuba relationship after 1898.
Cultural distinction is most powerfully reflected in how the United States
solely negotiated the Treaty of Paris with Spain, not only with Cubans left
out of negotiations but also with Spain ceding its colony to the United
States.109 Cubans were viewed as incapable of self-government. Cubans
105. See Christina Duffy Burnett, “They Say I Am Not an American”. . . : The NonCitizen National and the Law of American Empire, 48 VA. J. INT’L L. 659, 662 (2008);
Josep M. Fradera, Reading Imperial Transitions: Spanish Contraction, British
Expansion, and American Irruption, in COLONIAL CRUCIBLE: EMPIRE IN THE MAKING
OF THE MODERN AMERICAN STATE 34 (Alfred W. McCoy & A. Scarano eds., 2009)
(explaining how amidst imperial rivalries and competition, tensions of political equality
and representation encumbered empires after the nineteenth century); Patrick Wolfe,
Race and Citizenship, OAH MAG. HIST., Oct. 2004, at 66-71 (describing how in
various multi-racial post-colonial societies—United States, Brazil, and Australia—race
would be used to continue social inequality when citizenship was increasingly
inclusive).
106. See F.H. HINSLEY, SOVEREIGNTY 26 (2d ed., Cambridge Univ. Press 1986)
(1966) (defining “sovereignty” as the “final and absolute political authority”).
107. See generally ANTONY ANGHIE, IMPERIALISM, SOVEREIGNTY, AND THE MAKING
OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 3 (2004).
108. See id. at 87-90.
109. See Luis E. Aguilar, Cuba c. 1860-1940, in 5 THE CAMBRIDGE HISTORY OF
LATIN AMERICA 229, 244 (Leslie Bethell ed., 1984) (noting that American troops were
already occupying Cuba during treaty negotiations and that no Cuban representatives
were present at the signing of the treaty).
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had been involved in multiple, protracted, and violent struggles for
independence since 1865, with the United States watching closely. While
some Americans wanted to annex Cuba as early as the 1840s, by the end of
the century the racial factor, both in Cuba’s mixed-race population and the
domestic wounds from reconstruction, inhibited decisive action.110
Ironically, Cubans achieved measurable success after 1895 without
American military input because Afro-Cubans were included in military
leadership.111 Fearing Cuban rebels would win independence and leave the
United States with no control and a non-European sovereign in close
proximity, the United States entered the war in April 1898. This was after
Cubans had been fighting for decades, and their victory was near. Four
months later, the United States negotiated Spain’s surrender and in the
process acquired a substantial empire.112 Cubans were excluded from
sovereignty negotiations and left hoping for either incorporation into the
United States or independence.
In 1902, Cuba became an American protectorate under the Platt
Amendment, until a 1934 bilateral treaty abrogated its most egregious
provisions.113 Consistent with protectorate status, the Platt Amendment
tempered Cuba’s sovereignty, making it neither fully independent nor a
formal colony. Included in Cuba’s constitution and the 1903 Treaty of
Reciprocity, the Platt Amendment required Cuba to lease, sell, or provide
the United States with land for a base.114 This led to a 1903 lease for the
base at Guantánamo Bay.115 A 1934 treaty eliminated the Amendment’s

110. Cuba was most vividly on the American political radar. By mid-1898,
President McKinley was bound by Congress’ Teller Amendment in the Declaration of
War on Spain, precluding any annexation Cuba. For this reason the Treaty ceded Cuba
to the United States and then after occupation it was made a protectorate. The Treaty
affirmed American sovereignty over Puerto Rico, Guam, and the Philippines.
111. Accord ADA FERRER, INSURGENT CUBA: RACE, NATION, AND REVOLUTION,
1868-1985 143 (1999) [hereinafter FERRER, INSURGENT CUBA]; Ada Ferrer, Rustic Men,
Civilized Nation: Race, Culture, and Contention on the Eve of Cuban Independence, 78
HISP. AM. HIST. REV. 663, 665-66 (1998) [hereinafter Ferrer, Rustic Men] (presenting
how Cuban independence discourses incorporated non-whites by 1895 but after
independence Cuban civic exclusion focused on cultural and social distinctions). See
generally Alejandro de la Fuente & Matthew Casey, Race and the Suffrage
Controversy in Cuba, 1898-1901 in COLONIAL CRUCIBLE, supra note 105, at 222-23.
112. Cf. Aguilar, supra note 109, at 245 (describing the events leading to the signing
of the peace treaty and American relations with Cuba afterward).
113. See generally LOUIS PEREZ, CUBA UNDER THE PLATT AMENDMENT (1991).
114. See id. at 42-47 (discussing the events that led to the creation of the Platt
Amendment); see also Pedro Capo-Rodríguez, The Platt Amendment, 17 AM. J. INT’L
L. 761, 763 (1923) (providing an excerpt from President McKinley’s speech to
Congress asking for authorization to secure peace between Cuba and Spain);
Commentary, The Origin and Purpose of the Platt Amendment, 8 AM. J. INT’L L. 565,
586 (1914) (detailing the adoption of the Platt Amendment and the military changes
that took place in Cuba immediately after).
115. U.S.-Cuba Feb. 1903 Lease, supra note 5.
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other sovereignty checks, but it affirmed that for an indefinite period the
United States would be able to occupy Guantánamo.116
This sovereignty exclusion is littered with the law’s cultural distinction
of assumptions of American superiority. First, with occupation, AfroCubans lost their right to vote, which Spanish and Cuban authorities had
previously allowed.117 Occupation authorities forbade Afro-Cubans from
voting. 118 They insisted American experiences informed the best choice
for Cuba. Second, the terms of American withdrawal, namely the Platt
Amendment, explicitly reasoned that Cubans could not be trusted with
sovereignty and that American input was needed.119 The United States
declared a “right to intervene” in Cuba and on multiple occasions sent its
troops to the island.120 American advantage was expressed in control over
Cuban debt. It was feared that if this were not supervised, debt default
would cause European intervention in Cuba, threatening American
security.
American positions on Cuba from before the War of 1898 and afterwards
expressed an “imperial ethos.”121 Public discourse and foreign policies
viewed Cuba in perspectives from which United States foreign policy
articulates a moral imperative over Cuba, tries to dominate its affairs, and
116. U.S.-Cuba 1934 Treaty, supra note 5.
117. See Fuente & Casey, supra note 111, 226 (covering the history of suffrage

rights in Cuba after the U.S. occupation).
118. See id. at 222-23 (showing how Afro-Cubans had suffrage rights before U.S.
occupation, which the United States eliminated by relying on cultural assumptions of
self-governance); see also Aline Helg, Race and Black Mobilization in Colonial and
Early Independent Cuba: A Comparative Perspective, 44 ETHNOHISTORY 53, 53 (1997)
(presenting how Cuban racial distinctions in the law were similar to a U.S. two-tier
system).
119. Specifically, the Amendment’s Article III states, “Cuba consents that the
United States may exercise a right to intervene for the preservation of Cuban
independence, the maintenance of a government adequate for the protection of life,
property, and individual liberty . . . .” U.S.-Cuba 1934 Treaty, supra note 5. Article
VII states that the United States could maintain Cuban independence, protect the
people of Cuba, and for American defense, “Cuba [would] sell or lease to the United
States lands necessary for coaling or naval stations at certain specified points to be
agreed upon with the President of the United States.” Id. at art. VII; see also DAVID
HEALY, DRIVE TO HEGEMONY 54 (1988) (describing the dissent against American
intervention in Cuba and the campaign that formed to pacify fears of American
interference).
120. After the 1898-1902 occupation ended, the United States intervened in Cuba in
multiple ways, e.g., with military occupation from 1906 to 1909, troops quelling
insurrection in 1912 and 1917, troops stationed during World War I, and military
pressure during financial and political reforms from 1921 to 1923. See generally Lester
H. Woolsey, The New Cuban Treaty, 28 AM. J. INT’L L. 528, 531 (1934) (describing
the various American occupations of Cuba after the 1898-1902 occupation: from 1906
to 1909, troops quelling insurrection in 1912 and 1917, troops stationed during World
War I, and military pressure during financial and political reforms from 1921 to 1923).
121. See LOUIS PEREZ, CUBA IN THE AMERICAN IMAGINATION: METAPHOR AND
IMPERIAL ETHOS 8, 258 (2008) (defining imperial ethos as the notion that America had
in its charge other countries that it was responsible for nurturing and protecting).
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acts out self-interest. Americans and their foreign policy paint Cuba in
metaphors such as the woman (beautiful, white, and needing United States
support), a “ripe fruit” so close to American shores and influence, the naive
or restless child (cast in black and diminutive imagery), and an ungratefully
rebellious savage.122 On one level these images present how Cuba was
viewed with demeaning and racist assumptions. They similarly affirm how
foreign policies reflect assumptions of U.S. superiority, by painting the
United States as savior, teacher, guardian, or civilizing agent.
A brief examination of statements from policymakers of the day presents
these cultural assumptions. In 1901, Senator Orville Platt, who proposed
the infamous amendment, explained that Cuba’s “social, racial, and
economic conditions” do not support self-government and that Cuba suffers
from an “inevitable race problem.”123 He added that the United States is an
independent “guarantor” of Cuba, obligated by “self-interest and duty”
whose “friendly advice and guidance” is “the real hope for a free Cuba.”124
He describes “Spaniards” as being endowed with “commercial instincts and
characteristics of the Jew” and the issues of “color” for “blacks” and
“mixed bloods” in Cuba as less important than “social distinction.”125
Blacks in Cuba are “absolutely black,” “not thick lipped,” with European
features, and superior regarding “capacity and efficiency.”126 The Cuban
“mulatto compares less favorably” with their counterparts in the United
States. This is due to blood and custom; Cuban “mulattos” have a mixture
of “Spaniard and negro” while Americans have a mix of “Anglo-Saxon and
negro.”127 Both mulattoes imitate.128 In the United States they imitate
Anglo-Saxon custom and “naturally aspire to participate in government,”
while in Cuba this is not the case.129 There, they are “docile” and only
politically concerned “under a sense of wrong and injustice” when
“emotions are excited,” helping them become “good fighter[s],” which
helped during the War.130
Secretary Root, the legal architect of American imperial efforts, argued
full sovereignty for these “backwards people” was impossible even far in

122. See id. at 258-64 (discussing these and other metaphors that were employed by
Americans to justify imperialism).
123. See Orville H. Platt, Our Relation to the People of Cuba and Porto Rico, 18
ANNALS AMER. ACAD. POLIT. & SOC. SCI. 145, 148-49, 153, 156, 158 (Jul. 1901).
124. Id. at 156, 158.
125. Id. at 149-50, 153.
126. Id. at 154.
127. Id.
128. Id.
129. Id.
130. Id.
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the future.131 A fear was that “uncivilized” nations would create instability
for world powers, feeding the propensity for violence and war. The United
States had a duty to stop this. In 1899, he described his pride in the
accomplishments of Cuban occupation, including teaching Cubans “how to
live clean and orderly lives,” “the simple elements of civil government,”
“how to go back to work, to earn their living,” and “how to become selfgoverning citizens of a free state.”132
The legal consequence of these cultural assumptions was a trustee
relationship evident in Cuba’s status as a protectorate. Rudyard Kipling’s
1899 poem about the “White Man’s Burden,” commenting on the United
States and the Philippines, presents these assumptions in empire.133 These
legal relationships, created in Cuba and elsewhere, were analogized to
parent and child or master and slave.134 They were the product of
contemporary ideologies on the United States’ place in the world,
influencing a decisive desire to expand as an empire. These include
Frederick Jackson Turner’s suggestion that the United States needed a new
frontier, central to national identity that had begun to disappear once the
Pacific Ocean was reached; Josiah Strong’s missionary charge for
Christians to convert populations abroad; and Mahan’s emphasis on naval
power and controlling sea passages with overseas bases, specifically
Guantánamo, to protect markets and spread the pacifying influence of
commerce.135 These views rested on racial ideologies of the time.
American leaders were influenced by ideas of “Teutonic” origins, claiming
descendents of Germania, such as Anglo-Saxons, possessed unique abilities
for legal order and other races did not.136
IV. CONCLUSION
Legal anomaly on the base was needed for imperial objectives in
American foreign relations after 1898. This Essay illuminates how
131. See HEALY, EXPANSIONISM, supra note 52, at 151 (quoting JESSUP, ELIHU
ROOT, VOL. 1, 378-79 (1938)).
132. Id. (quoting ROOT, MILITARY AND COLONIAL POLICY OF THE UNITED STATES;
ADDRESSES AND REPORTS 11-12 (Robert Bacon & James Brown Scott eds., 1970)).
133. See RUDYARD KIPLING, The White Man’s Burden: The United States & The
Philippine Islands, 1899, in RUDYARD KIPLING’S VERSE: INCLUSIVE EDITION, 18851918 371 (1919).
134. See Fiss, supra note 73, at 245 (explaining that the only way the United States
could justify its relationship with countries like the Philippines and Puerto Rico was to
take a paternalistic approach).
135. See LAFEBER, NEW EMPIRE, supra note 55, at 61, 66, 72, 88 (1998) (detailing
the different theories of the authors regarding colonization by the United States).
136. Mark Weiner, Teutonic Constitutionalism: The Role of Ethno-Juridical
Discourse in the Spanish-American War, in FOREIGN IN A DOMESTIC SENSE: PUERTO
RICO, AMERICAN EXPANSION, AND THE CONSTITUTION 48, 49 (Christina Duffy Burnett
& Burke Marshall eds., 2001).
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anomaly suited “empire as space, markets, and culture.” Mixing material
and cultural interpretations of empire and overseas authority, this Essay
raises valuable questions on how the law contributes to empire-building. In
spatial terms, the base is a manifestation of American extraterritoriality.
Being outside American and Cuban sovereignty, but within American
control and jurisdiction, the base expands the geographic space of
American influence. Its legal borders are flexible, adaptable, and without
limit. The Platt Amendment confirmed this American influence over Cuba
without making it a formal colony. The Amendment required Cuba to
provide the United States with a base. This became GTMO, with the
anomaly of Cuba’s “ultimate sovereignty” and the United States’s
“complete jurisdiction and control” over the base.
In economic terms, the base allowed the United States to protect its
regional markets and assert global influence after 1898. The base
supported invasions in Cuba, the Dominican Republic, Haiti, and
Nicaragua, and the patrolling of the Caribbean. GTMO permitted
American naval power to protect inter-continental trade and exert
geopolitical influence on the seas. Avoiding formal colonies and
expanding geopolitical influence, these were cutting-edge achievements for
the time, for regional foreign relations and domestic economics. In cultural
terms, the base reflects how Cuban sovereignty was denied through foreign
relations with the United States. Cultural assumptions premised on race,
Cubans as a latino, black, and mixed-race populations, and Anglo-Saxon
superiority influenced American attitudes about Cubans. They were
viewed as unable to self-govern, thus they could not be fully sovereign.
Legal instruments such as the Treaty of Paris, the Platt Amendment, and
lease agreements are all outgrowths of these assumptions. Their provisions
on sovereignty express these racist and cultural assumptions. The base is a
remnant of not only empire and history, but also the assumptions that
Cubans were inferior.
Accordingly viewed in historical and contextual terms, the base’s “legal
black hole” appears to have a consistent purpose. Taking Colás’s
interpretation of “empire as space, markets, and culture,” GTMO’s legal
anomaly clearly benefits American expansion by avoiding possible checks
in American, Cuban, and international law. This historic description of
anomaly explains why detainees appear as “outsiders inside” American law
with regard to individual rights protections and judicial review. They are at
the legal peripheries of American jurisdiction that is clearly intended to be
extraterritorial. Rights protections overseas may not be clear or even
legally denied, but American power overseas remains unquestioned. This
explains why popular discourse rarely questions why the United States has
a base in Cuban territory, even though the United States and Cuba lack
formal diplomatic relations.
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This Essay describes the past to motivate inquiry about the present.
Guantánamo has been presented as a “legal black hole,” with its anomaly
being an imperial objective since 1898. Since 2002 nearly 800 men have
been detained on the base as “outsiders inside," that is, outside rights
protections in American and international law but inside American
jurisdiction.137 This is only possible with Guantánamo’s legal anomaly.
While the detainee population has decreased to 176,138 the most dramatic
cases have been detainees who were found to be no longer unlawful enemy
combatants, but not free to leave the base.139 The plight of the Uighur
detainees illustrates this “outsiders inside” dilemma, posing enormous
questions for their future and potential freedom and how law may remedy
or instead perpetuate these injustices. Recent litigation about detainees
from Algeria and Russia, no longer found to be unlawful combatants and
waiting for release, shows anomaly clouds their future.140 Meanwhile, on
July 12, 2010, the five Uighur detainees petitioned the Circuit Court for an
en banc hearing to reconsider a new fact-finding hearing.141 This comes
after the circuit court rejected a prior motion for such a fact-finding hearing
on May 28 and District Judge Urbina, LatCrit XIV keynote speaker,
ordered their release from GTMO on October 8, 2009. They remain as
outsiders inside, after being held at the base for over eight years. President
137. Names of the Detained in Guantanamo Bay, Cuba, supra note 8.
138. The New York Times reports that as of July 26, 2010, 176 detainees remain at

the base. See The Guantánamo Docket: Detainees Held, supra note 8.
139. See Hussain, supra note 41, 744 (noting that many individuals detained at
Guantanamo Bay have never been close to a battlefield and therefore could not be
enemy combatants).
140. See Order, Belbacha v. Copeman (Jan. 3, 2010, D.C. Cir.) available at
http://www.scotusblog.com/wp-content/uploads/2010/06/CA-Belbacha-order-6-310.pdf (denying a petition for an en banc hearing); In re Guantanamo Bay Detainee
Litigation, Misc. No. 08-0442 (TFH) and Civil Action No. 05-2349 (RMC), 2010 WL
1539845 (Apr. 19, 2010, D.D.C); Lyle Denniston, “Kiyemba II,” back again?:
Algerian detainee’s new plea, SCOTUSBLOG, Apr. 28, 2010, available at
http://www.scotusblog.com/2010/04/kiyemba-ii-back-again/. See generally Lyle
Denniston, Major fight brews on Munaf: The other 2008 detainee ruling,
July
1,
2010,
available
at
SCOTUSBLOG,
http://www.scotusblog.com/2010/07/analysis-major-fight-brews-on-munaf/ (describing
the series of district court orders to release and bar relocation, district court order for
the Department of State in court, the Court of Appeals orders to the district court, and
the arguments developed from Kiyemba II and Munaf v. Geren, and providing links to
orders and notice of appeal); Nancy Talanian, Guantánamo Uighurs Are Not Alone,
HUFFINGTON POST, Apr. 22, 2010, http://www.huffingtonpost.com/nancytalanian/guantnamo-uighurs-are-not_b_547548.html (explaining that lawyers were
“unable to find out what Belbacha [a detainee] is supposed to have done” that brought
on his sentence).
141. See Kiyemba v. Obama (Nos. 08-5424, 08-5425, 08-5426, 08-5427, 08-5428,
08-5429), Petition for Rehearing En Banc, (D.C. Cir. July 12, 2010) available at
www.scotusblog.com/wp-content/uploads/2010/Kiyemba-I-en-banc-petition-7-1210.pdf. See generally Lyle Denniston, U.S.: Guantanamo habeas working Uighurs’
new challenge opposed, SCOTUSBLOG, (Aug. 2, 2010) available at
www.scotusblog.com/2010/08/u-s-guantanamo-habeas-working.
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Obama promised to end base detentions within a year of January 23, 2009,
yet 176 men still remain over a year and half later. In conclusion, to make
sense of what assumptions and context facilitate such a pervasive black
hole, keeping outsiders inside, this Essay examines the base’s history and
anomaly’s role in it.
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